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Simple Summary: Animal experimentation evokes strong emotional responses in people 
on both sides of the debate surrounding its ethical status. However, the true level of its 
usefulness to society may only be discerned by careful examination of reliable scientific 
evidence. My recent book, The Costs and Benefits of Animal Experiments, reviewed more 
than 500 relevant scientific publications. Recently in this journal, however, a reviewer 
essentially accused me of bias. Yet the conclusions of my book are based on sound 
reasoning and strong evidence, and no critic has yet provided any substantive evidence to 
refute them. 
Abstract: My recent book entitled The Costs and Benefits of Animal Experiments seeks to 
answer a key question within animal ethics, namely: is animal experimentation ethically 
justifiable? Or, more precisely, is it justifiable within the utilitarian cost:benefit framework 
that fundamentally underpins most regulations governing animal experimentation? To 
answer this question I reviewed more than 500 scientific publications describing animal 
studies, animal welfare impacts, and alternative research, toxicity testing and educational 
methodologies. To minimise bias I focused primarily on large-scale systematic reviews that 
had examined the human clinical and toxicological utility of animal studies. Despite this, 
Dr. Susanne Prankel recently reviewed my book in this journal, essentially accusing me of 
bias. However, she failed to provide any substantive evidence to refute my conclusions, let 
alone evidence of similar weight to that on which they are based. Those conclusions are, in 
fact, firmly based on utilitarian ethical reasoning, informed by scientific evidence of 
considerable strength, and I believe they are robust. 
Keywords: The Costs and Benefits of Animal Experiments; animal experiment; animal 
study; animal ethics; animal welfare; 3Rs; utilitarian; bias; systematic review; Palgrave 
Macmillan Animal Ethics Series 
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1. Introduction  
Recently in this journal Dr. Susanne Prankel reviewed my new book [1], The Costs and Benefits of 
Animal Experiments [2]. I appreciate the care Dr. Prankel clearly took with several aspects of her 
review. Unfortunately, however, she appears to have taken objection to the conclusions of my book. In 
essence, I stated that, “When considering costs and benefits overall, one cannot reasonably conclude 
that the benefits accruing to human patients or consumers, or to those motivated by scientific curiosity 
or profit, exceed the costs incurred by animals subjected to scientific procedures. On the contrary, the 
evidence indicates that actual human benefit is rarely—if ever—sufficient to justify such costs.” 
2. Accusations of Bias 
In her review, however, Dr. Prankel essentially accused me of bias. She stated that my 
interpretation of the evidence collated within my book was debatable, and that opposing viewpoints 
were under-represented. She even went so far as to include “An Evaluation with Bias” within the title 
of her review.  
This is an unusually bold claim to make within an academic journal, and readers might reasonably 
assume that it must therefore have been based on evidence and reasoning of corresponding strength. 
During more than a decade of researching and publishing in this field, on rare occasion I’ve been 
similarly challenged by others. Yet neither Dr. Prankel nor any of those others have ever provided any 
substantive evidence to refute my conclusions, let alone evidence of similar weight to that on which 
they are based. 
Perhaps because it involves procedures such as disease modelling or toxicity testing that can result 
in particularly high levels of suffering when compared to most other forms of animal use, animal 
experimentation is especially controversial. Such procedures evoke strong emotional responses in 
many people, and sometimes, strong criticism, which in turn leads to strong defences by some who 
support such research. The debate concerning the moral status of such research is thus coloured by 
strong emotions on either side, and predisposed to polarisation. In such a climate it is easy to stray 
from sound reasoning and evidence. However, the facts about the human clinical and toxicological 
utility of animal experimentation may only be discerned by careful examination of reliable scientific 
evidence, and ethical assessments of such research are only likely to survive critical scrutiny when 
based on sound reasoning, which is informed by that evidence. 
For the record, I am not biased. Or rather, not unduly biased, acknowledging that it is virtually 
impossible to fully eliminate the myriad biases relating to a multitude of issues that are possessed by 
all people. In fact, I have gone to considerable lengths to eliminate bias from my book, to the extent 
possible. My conclusions are firmly based on utilitarian ethical reasoning, which is informed by 
scientific evidence of considerable strength, and I believe they are robust. Were substantial contrary 
evidence to emerge, my conclusions would alter accordingly. This presently appears unlikely, 
however, given the quantity, quality and consistency of the existing evidence on this issue. 




3. Utilitarian Ethical Evaluation of Animal Experiments 
In essence, my book seeks to answer a moral question of considerable importance to those policy 
makers responsible for regulating scientific animal use, to society at large, and to the field of animal 
ethics; namely: is animal experimentation ethically justifiable? 
As stated in my book: “The core principle underpinning animal experimentation regulation and 
policy is that the likely benefits of such research must outweigh its expected costs. Although 
considerable financial and human collateral costs do exist, the main costs are borne by the animals 
subjected to such research. And although such research may be directed at yielding benefits for animal 
species or the environment, the overwhelming majority is intended for human benefit, whether through 
the advancement of knowledge, through the development or toxicity testing of clinical interventions 
and consumer or industrial products, or through educational applications. 
This utilitarian cost:benefit analysis underpins all fundamental regulation governing animal 
experimentation. Directive 2010/63/EU on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes, 
which directs such animal use in all EU member states, asserts that it is ‘essential, both on moral and 
scientific grounds, to ensure that each use of an animal is carefully evaluated as to the scientific or 
educational validity, usefulness and relevance of the expected result of that use. The likely harm to the 
animal should be balanced against the expected benefits of the project.’ [3]”.  
4. Human Clinical and Toxicological Utility of Animal Models  
Much contemporary reliance on animal models within biomedical research and toxicity testing is 
heavily dependent on assumptions of human utility—and, in particular, of reasonable predictivity for 
human outcomes. In recent years, however, a growing body of systematic reviews have tested these 
assumptions. In only two of 20 such reviews located during the most comprehensive survey published 
to date [4,5] did the authors conclude that animal models were either significantly useful in 
contributing to the development of human clinical interventions, or substantially consistent with 
clinical outcomes. Furthermore, one of these reviews was contentious. It concluded that rodent models 
were predictive of the effects of agents aimed at preventing colon cancer recurrence in humans. 
However, few agents were tested, and two of the three agents tested in mice actually produced 
different outcomes in humans [6]. 
Included within these 20 systematic reviews were studies examining the human clinical utility of 
invasive chimpanzee experiments, of highly cited animal experiments published in leading scientific 
journals, and of experiments approved by ethics committees at least partly on the basis of specific 
claims that these animal studies were likely to lead to concrete advances in human healthcare. Seven 
additional reviews also failed to demonstrate reliable predictivity of human toxicities such as 
carcinogenicity and teratogenicity. Results in animal models were frequently equivocal, or inconsistent 
with human outcomes. Chapters 5 and 6 of my book examine these reviews in detail. 
Systematic reviews investigating the clinical utility of invasive chimpanzee studies, and the 
toxicological utility of animal carcinogenicity studies, both form major foci of my book. Such studies 
are particularly significant, given that other animal models are even less likely to be generally 
predictive of human outcomes than chimpanzees, and that other fields of toxicity testing are even less 




likely to provide public health benefits, than carcinogenicity testing. Given the poor performance of 
animal models in both of these fields, contemporary reliance on animal models must also be 
questioned in other fields of clinically oriented biomedical research and human toxicity testing. 
5. Factors Limiting Human Utility 
A range of factors appear responsible for such poor human clinical and toxicological utility, which 
are described in detail in Chapter 7 of my book. These include inherent genotypic and phenotypic 
differences between humans and test animal species; the distortion of animal characteristics such as 
physiological and immunological parameters, disease predisposition, and cognitive and behavioural 
characteristics, along with dependent experimental outcomes, by stressful experimental environments 
and protocols; and the poor methodological quality of many animal studies documented in numerous 
systematic reviews. 
As Dr. Prankel states, “flawed study design cannot discredit animal experimentation per se”. It is 
theoretically true that problems arising from stressors and poor methodological quality might be 
minimised, although fundamental changes to the practice of laboratory animal science would be 
required, given their widespread prevalence. However, many limitations resulting from interspecies 
differences are likely to be technically and theoretically impossible to overcome. 
6. Costs Incurred by Laboratory Animals 
The degrees of actual or likely human utility are major determinants when conducting a utilitarian 
ethical evaluation of animal experimentation. The other key determinants relate to the nature, severity 
and prevalence of the impacts experienced by the animal subjects. 
Accurate assessment of such impacts is markedly impeded by lack of published national statistics, 
and by lack of standardisation among countries that do publish them. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
many millions of animals are subjected to invasive scientific procedures annually. By far the most 
accurate estimation of global laboratory animal use published to date assessed animal use in 2005. At 
least 126.9 million non-human vertebrates were subjected to fundamental or medically applied 
biomedical research, toxicity testing, or educational use; were killed for the provision of experimental 
tissues or as surplus to requirements; or were used to maintain established genetically modified (GM) 
strains [7,8]. However, for several reasons this estimate remains highly conservative, and it also 
excludes certain additional categories raising ethical concerns. 
As described in Chapter 4 of my book, a wide variety of stressors have the potential to cause 
significant stress, fear, and possibly distress in laboratory animals. These may be associated with the 
capture of wild-sourced species such as primates to supply laboratories or breeding centres; with 
transportation, which may be prolonged for some animals; with laboratory housing and environments; 
and with both routine and invasive laboratory procedures. 
A substantial minority of all procedures are markedly invasive. These include procedures resulting 
in death, surgical procedures (excluding minor procedures), major physiological challenges, and the 
production of GM strains. The best national statistics describing procedural invasiveness originate 
from Canada. The proportion of markedly invasive procedures there has ranged between 
approximately 29 and 44 % over the past decade [9] (see also Chapter 3 of my book). 




A sizeable majority of all procedures utilise no anaesthetics of any kind. Unfortunately, however, 
Canadian figures do not indicate anaesthetic use. In this case the best statistics originate from Britain, 
where procedures conducted without anaesthesia fluctuated between approximately 59 and 69% of 
annual totals during the past two decades [10] (see also Chapter 3). 
To assess animal impacts it would clearly be helpful to know the frequency of analgesic use, the 
degree of correlation between markedly invasive procedures and anaesthetic or analgesic use, and the 
prevalence of environmental enrichment and socialisation opportunities. Unfortunately however, such 
information is reported sporadically if at all, and is excluded from national statistics. 
Nevertheless, a large body of studies have demonstrated that the stress caused by laboratory 
housing and environments, and by relatively common laboratory procedures such as non-invasive 
handling, venipuncture (blood sampling), and orogastric gavaging (the insertion of an oesophageal 
tube to facilitate the toxicity assessment of ‘ingested’ compounds), may all result in profound, 
statistically significant distortions in a range of physiological indices, including cardiovascular 
parameters and serum concentrations of glucose and various hormones. Behaviour may be markedly 
altered, and behavioural stereotypies and increased aggression may develop over time, as may 
alterations in certain neuroanatomical parameters and even cognitive capacities [11–13] (see also 
Chapter 4). Some of these effects are also likely to be sequelae of other stressors, such as invasive 
procedures and transportation. 
Such stressors do not only create significant animal welfare and ethical problems. As previously 
noted, the resultant effects on laboratory animals may distort a range of experimental outcomes, such 
as those dependent on accurate determination of physiological or behavioural characteristics. 
7. A Debatable Interpretation? 
This evidence describing the human clinical and toxicological utility of invasive animal research, 
and the impacts experienced by laboratory animals, is drawn from more than 500 scientific 
publications cited within my book. Although certain knowledge gaps remain, I believe it is 
nevertheless clear that sufficient evidence now exists to support the conclusion that the human benefits 
accruing from invasive animal research do not generally exceed the costs incurred by the animals 
subjected to that research. Dr. Prankel, however, apparently found this conclusion debatable, accusing 
me of under-representing opposing viewpoints. 
As briefly acknowledged in Chapter 12 of my book, a diverse range of philosophical, cultural and 
religious viewpoints about our moral duties towards animals and people could be applied to scientific 
animal use. Examination of these viewpoints was not the purpose of my book, however, which was 
primarily concerned with a detailed examination of the published scientific evidence describing the 
human benefits of such research, and the costs incurred by the animals subjected to it. 
If my main conclusion is wrong, then it means that the human benefits of such research do 
generally exceed the costs incurred by the animals. The most important corollary would be that such 
research is normally justified within the utilitarian philosophical framework most commonly applied to 
the regulation of animal experiments. 




However, I believe it is only possible to draw such a conclusion if a profoundly unequal weighting 
is applied, in which relatively infrequent or minor human benefits are considered more important than 
the significant adverse impacts commonly experienced by literally millions of laboratory animals.  
Yet such a weighting of interests is increasingly inconsistent with our growing understanding of the 
psychological and social characteristics of the species used in laboratories, including their ability to 
experience suffering and pleasure; of the impacts that result from laboratory environments and even 
relatively common laboratory procedures; and of the moral implications that stem from this knowledge.  
8. The Evaluation of Evidence 
Dr. Prankel provided several additional criticisms relating to the evidence contained in my book, 
and its evaluation. She criticized me for making little mention of examples where transferability of 
data gained from animal experimentation to human patients was good. Such examples do exist, as do 
counter-examples in which transferability of data was poor. Yet, I deliberately chose not dwell on 
either, because, “only small numbers of experiments are normally reviewed in [such] case studies, and 
their selection may be subject to bias.” (Chapter 5). Instead, I relied primarily on large-scale systematic 
reviews as my primary form of evidence. As stated, “To provide more definitive conclusions, 
systematic reviews of the human clinical or toxicological utility of large numbers of animal 
experiments are necessary. Experiments included in such reviews should be selected without bias, via 
randomisation or similarly methodical and impartial means.” 
An example of such a systematic review was that published by Hackam & Redelmeier [14], which I 
described in Chapter 5. This study examined the transferability of the tiny proportion of animal studies 
that were published from 1980–2000 in the seven leading scientific journals when ranked by citation 
impact factor, that had received more than 500 citations each. The authors reasonably assumed that 
such animal studies would be most likely to translate to human clinical trials. Of 76 animal studies 
meeting these criteria, they found that 36.8% (28/76) were replicated in randomised human trials, 
18.4% (14/76) were contradicted by such trials, and 44.7% (34/76) had not translated to clinical trials 
by May 2006. Such failure to translate often indicates that concerns have arisen about human safety or 
efficacy. 
Some of the other systematic reviews I described used citation analyses to evaluate the importance 
of animal studies in contributing to future publications, particularly those describing clinical 
interventions ultimately efficacious in humans. As Dr. Prankel noted, the use of citation analyses is 
controversial. As stated in Chapter 5 however, “Citation frequencies are not, of course, a definitive 
indication of the benefits, or lack thereof, of scientific research. Uncited studies may also contribute  
to the advancement of biomedical knowledge, through a variety of mechanisms. However, citation 
frequencies do generally provide a quantifiable and reasonably objective approximation of utility,  
or lack thereof, and they have been shown to be among the most reliable indicators of research  
quality [15–17]. Research that makes a significant contribution to a field—such as by confirming or 
refuting hypotheses—is very likely to be cited by future papers, as is research that produces interesting 
or controversial outcomes. On the other hand, research that is inconclusive or of little interest or 
significance is much less likely to be cited.” The fact that a sizeable proportion of the animal studies 




examined were not subsequently cited by publications of any kind, let alone by human clinical 
publications, is therefore an issue of legitimate, and considerable, concern. 
Finally, my book also comprehensively reviewed the use of animals within life and health sciences 
education, and alternative research, toxicity testing and educational strategies. With respect to such 
alternatives, Dr. Prankel criticized me for giving credit “for the mere potential of being beneficial”, 
whilst denying similar credit to invasive animal experiments. This claim is itself debatable, however. 
As I concluded in Chapter 8, “Non-animal investigative methods cannot, of course, provide answers to 
all questions about humans, particularly given present technological limitations. However, the same is 
certainly true of animal models, which have a more limited capacity for further development.” Such an 
evaluation is hardly one-sided. Yet, different standards are actually warranted when ethically 
evaluating the use of animal and non-animal models, because large numbers of animals are seriously 
harmed and killed in animal studies, but not when non-animal models are used. Accordingly, the 
benefit of the former must be established far more strongly in order to achieve an equivalent ethical 
status—a point not acknowledge by Dr. Prankel. 
9. The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series 
Finally, the International Standard Book Numbers (ISBNs) provided by Dr. Prankel were not 
actually those of my book as stated, but were for the Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series [18]. 
Produced in partnership with the Ferrater Mora Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, the series aims to 
provide key introductory and advanced texts that map out ethical positions on animal issues, and that 
are interdisciplinary in nature. At the time of writing six of fifteen books commissioned within the 
series had been published, of which my book was the third. The correct ISBN for my book, which is 
available in hardback from Palgrave Macmillan, is 978-0-230-24392-7. 
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